In 1990, the United States produced roughly thirty-seven percent of the world's semiconductors. By 2020, that share had fallen to twelve percent. The decline tracked the broader logic of comparative advantage that dominated American economic thinking for most of the intervening period: let countries with lower labor costs handle manufacturing, focus domestic resources on design, software, and services, and trust that the resulting efficiency gains would benefit everyone. The pandemic supply chain crisis, followed by a sharper recognition of what semiconductor dependency actually means for military readiness and economic security, produced a rapid reversal of that logic. The CHIPS and Science Act, signed in 2022, committed fifty-two billion dollars in federal subsidies to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, with the explicit goal of reshoring production that had moved to Taiwan, South Korea, and increasingly China. Whether it will work is a question that the next decade will answer. What is already clear is that the attempt is far more complicated than writing checks to chip companies. TSMC's decision to build a fabrication facility outside Phoenix became the most scrutinized test case. The Taiwanese chipmaker, which manufactures the most advanced chips in the world, began construction on a plant that was supposed to be producing four-nanometer chips by 2024. The timeline slipped, repeatedly. TSMC attributed the delays to a shortage of skilled American workers with the specific expertise required to build and operate a semiconductor fab. The company brought workers from Taiwan to help train American employees, a move that generated resentment on both sides and highlighted the gap between the theoretical appeal of reshoring and the practical difficulty of transplanting an industrial ecosystem. The workforce problem is not a bug in the reshoring strategy; it is one of its core challenges. Taiwan and South Korea have spent decades building the technical education infrastructure, the supplier networks, the institutional knowledge, and the workplace culture that sustains advanced semiconductor manufacturing. The United States has not. Building that ecosystem from scratch is not primarily a capital problem; the federal government can provide capital. It is primarily a time and institution problem, and those cannot be subsidized away. The geopolitical logic for making the attempt remains compelling. Taiwan currently manufactures roughly ninety percent of the world's most advanced chips. The strategic implications of that concentration became explicit during the period of heightened tension in the Taiwan Strait, when analysts and policymakers openly discussed what a Chinese move against Taiwan would mean for global electronics production. The answer, as best as anyone could calculate, involved disruption severe enough to make the pandemic chip shortage look manageable by comparison. From that perspective, even a partially successful reshoring effort, one that brings advanced manufacturing back to the United States at higher cost and with greater difficulty than the most optimistic projections suggested, might be worth the investment. The argument is not that American chips will be cheaper than Taiwanese chips. They will not. The argument is that the insurance value of domestic production capacity is worth the premium. The domestic industrial landscape is responding to the incentive, even if unevenly. Intel's plans for Ohio fabs have been repeatedly revised as the company navigated its own financial difficulties. Samsung has broken ground in Texas. Micron, which focuses on memory chips rather than logic chips, has committed to significant expansion in Idaho and New York. The investment is real and substantial, measured in hundreds of billions of dollars over the course of the decade. What the finished map looks like by 2030 will depend on whether the technical challenges get solved, whether the political will to sustain the subsidies and the procurement preferences survives changes in administration, and whether the global competitive environment, particularly from Chinese chipmakers working to climb the technology ladder despite export controls, remains manageable. The bet has been placed. The outcome is genuinely uncertain.