The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC was received, when it was signed, as the end of the longest-running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. More than fifty years of fighting, more than two hundred thousand dead, and millions displaced, coming to a formal end in a ceremony in Havana that the Colombian electorate then narrowly voted to reject, before a modified version of the agreement was ratified by Congress. Ten years on, what the peace looks like in practice is complicated enough to resist easy characterization as either success or failure. The FARC as a unified political and military organization has not returned to the field. The party it became, which renamed itself Comunes, has participated in elections and holds seats in congress. The former combatants who went through the reintegration program have, in the large majority, not returned to armed activity. The infrastructure of the peace, the truth commission, the special jurisdiction for peace, the rural reform components, exists and has produced real outputs. What the peace has not done is end armed violence in Colombia. The countryside that the FARC controlled for decades has been contested, sometimes violently, by successor groups that emerged from the fragments of the FARC that rejected the deal, by the ELN guerrilla organization that never entered the negotiations, by the Gulf Clan and other drug trafficking organizations, and by armed groups of various ideological colorings that have moved into spaces where the state has not followed. The murder rate in Colombia, which fell significantly in the years around the peace deal as FARC violence declined, has been rising again in rural areas most affected by the successor conflict. Human rights organizations document regular killings of social leaders, indigenous community leaders, and environmental activists, people who are targets precisely because they occupy positions of authority in communities that multiple armed groups want to control. The government of Gustavo Petro, Colombia's first left-wing president, came to office in 2022 with a "total peace" strategy that sought to negotiate simultaneously with multiple armed groups, including the ELN and some of the FARC dissident factions. The negotiations have been complicated and uneven. The ELN has engaged in talks while continuing armed activity. Some dissident groups have shown little interest in political solutions. And the underlying economic drivers of armed conflict, primarily the cocaine trade, which involves Colombian territory in every stage from cultivation to export, remain as potent as ever. The rural reform components of the 2016 agreement, which were meant to address the land inequality and lack of state presence that had made the countryside fertile ground for insurgency, have been implemented slowly and partially. Land redistribution is a politically sensitive issue that runs into resistance from landowners and their political allies. Building state institutions in areas that had essentially governed themselves through armed actors for decades is a long-term project that requires sustained political will and fiscal commitment. What Colombia has achieved is real: the transformation of the FARC into a political party, however small and complicated, and the reduction of large-scale guerrilla warfare in most of the country. What Colombia has not achieved is a stable peace in the specific areas where peace mattered most, the rural margins where the economics of cocaine and the weakness of legitimate institutions create conditions that armed groups exploit. The gap between what was promised and what has been delivered is not a reason to condemn the peace process, but it is a necessary part of understanding what a partial peace in a structurally complex society actually looks like.